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Chinese FDI in Australia: drivers and perceptions 
A revised and edited version of the presentation on 27 February 2013 in Sydney 
by Professor Zha Daojiong, Inaugural Lowy Institute-Rio Tinto China Fellow 
Introduction 
Australia has been remarkably successful at attracting Chinese investment in recent years.  
Australia has been the top destination for foreign direct investment (FDI) since the mid-
2000s.  Despite this, the investment relationship has not been without difficulties. In 
Australia, there is unease about Chinese investment in strategic sectors such as mining and 
agriculture. In China, there is a feeling that Chinese investment is discriminated against in 
Australia’s screening of incoming investment applications. Because Chinese investment in 
Australia is a relatively new phenomenon and because the geographic and cultural distances 
between the two countries are wide, there is a high risk that misperceptions – both Australian 
and Chinese – will trump reality. 
Australia and China have an obvious interest in managing these problems, both in terms of the 
economic relationship and the broader bilateral relationship. Australia has been a net importer 
of foreign direct investment (FDI) since Federation.  China is new as a source of FDI in the 
Australian economy. It is still relatively small despite significant growth since the 2008 global 
financial crisis. In terms of stocks, Chinese FDI has grown from 0.92 per cent in 2008 of total 
FDI in Australia to 2.63 per cent in 2011.
1
 Approved investment flows from China into 
Australia rose dramatically in 2008, to be followed by a downward pattern of fluctuations in 
subsequent years, until a new surge in 2012.
2
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Despite the comparatively small amount of Chinese FDI in Australia, understanding the 
drivers of Chinese investment is important. First, FDI in general is vital to Australia’s 
economic wellbeing. Chinese FDI is likely to grow globally and at the same time there will be 
more competition for Chinese investment. Thus, to remain competitive in attracting Chinese 
FDI, it is important for Australia to understand how it is perceived by Chinese investors. 
Second, Chinese FDI has attracted significant attention in the media and broader public in 
Australia. A nuanced analysis of the drivers will serve as a good basis for informed discourse 
on Australia’s national interest in regards to Chinese FDI. 
For China, Australia is an attractive investment destination for a number of reasons.  It is 
already a major resource provider to China and is a low risk destination for Chinese 
investment given its political stability and institutional strength at the government and 
business levels.  It is also important in terms of helping Chinese companies gain experience 
investing in developed countries.  This is not just important to the companies themselves.  It 
also helps to build China’s national reputation as global economic player, overcoming the 
country’s long standing and pervasive image of being little more than a low-cost labour 
provider capable of succeeding in poor developing countries only. 
The aim of my research was to identify a number of issues that do require greater attention in 
both countries’ efforts to strengthen the investment relationship.  It is by no means a 
comprehensive treatment of the relationship, but instead is concerned largely with Chinese 
perceptions of Australia as an investment destination.  It is based on over forty interviews 
conducted in Canberra, Sydney, Perth, and Melbourne during my fellowship at the Lowy 
Institute from January through March 2013. The interviewees were selected on the basis of 
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their expertise and experience with Chinese FDI. The interviewees can be broadly grouped 
into five main categories: Chinese investors in Australia; senior Australian managers in 
companies that have received significant Chinese investment; consultants, both Australian and 
Chinese nationals, who advise Chinese companies on Australian investments; senior 
Australian government officials at the state and federal levels; and experts in academia. 
My research mainly focused on direct investment the resources sector.  Investment in this 
sector accounts for 91% (79% mining; 11.8% oil & gas) of Chinese FDI in Australia.
3
 The 
resources sector also tends to attract greater public scrutiny which often means that Chinese 
investment in this sector becomes a focus for political debate within Australia or even 
diplomatic discussions between the two countries. 
 
The first section of the presentation addresses the structural factors driving Chinese FDI. The 
second section offers general observations about why Chinese companies see Australia as an 
attractive investment destination, particularly in the resources sector. The third section is my 
assessment of Chinese perceptions of the risks of investing in Australia. 
 
What drives Chinese FDI? 
A key theme in international observations of China’s foreign economic policy is the 
perception that the central government in Beijing pursues a strategic approach to investing 
abroad, particularly in the resources sector. The term ‘strategic’ conjures images of a well-
conceived, centrally-controlled and thoroughly coordinated strategy to achieve control of the 
world’s resources.4 Reference to the existence of a Zou chu qu program by academics and 
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others who study Chinese FDI has become standard. The phrase, translated into English as 
‘go out’, is a program run by the Chinese government to encourage Chinese companies to 
invest abroad. It is in reality part of a twin expression with Qing jin lai (invite in [foreign 
investment]). In other words, in Chinese foreign economic policy, for Chinese companies to 
invest abroad is as natural as for foreign companies to invest in China. 
Prior to the enunciation of a ‘go out’ policy by the central government in 2000, there were 
three routes through which contemporary China pursued trade and investment interactions 
with markets overseas. One route was Hong Kong, which was both a destination for Chinese 
investment and a hub for linking Chinese companies with foreign counterparts, including 
those in the industrialized West. This dated back to the mid-1950s. Another route was to bid 
for labour and engineering services in the construction sector of some Middle Eastern and 
North African oil-exporting countries, taking advantage of increased demand for these 
services created by the rise in oil prices in the early 1970s. A third route came through the 
transformation of China’s foreign aid projects into investments, most notably in Africa. 
It took modern China over half a century to get to the stage where some Chinese companies 
were able to make investments in developed economies. In the early 1980s, Chinese 
companies were ill equipped to enter into competitive bidding for projects overseas.  As 
China's overall economic situation improved, the basic attitude of the government toward 
outbound FDI also became more encouraging. 
The Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-1999 strengthened the view among Chinese companies 
that the time had come for China to diversify its foreign investment portfolios. There was 
recognition of risks beyond the influence of Chinese companies such as volatility in world 
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currency markets and resource prices. Then in 2008 after the global financial crisis broke out, 
the central and local governments as well as banks injected a stimulus package of 4 trillion 
Yuan into the Chinese economy.
5
 This massive domestic investment, together with growing 
trade surpluses became the principle engines of expansion of Chinese FDI.
6
 Thus, what seems 
to have been a wave of Chinese foreign investment in the past few years should not be 
misread as indicative of an unstoppable future trend. 
Basic motivations for Chinese-owned production overseas, like that of other countries, 
include: to secure natural resources, new markets, improved efficiency and strategic assets. 
The economic goals and policy objectives include the following: 
7
 
 To support the exports of domestic manufacturers 
 To help secure a reliable supply of resources and energy, particularly when they 
cannot be produced domestically in China 
 To acquire information and learning about operating abroad 
 To improve access to foreign technology 
 To enhance the overall competitiveness of Chinese companies through the 
diversification of their business activities 
 
The role of SOEs 
A phenomenon that has contributed to international speculation about non-economic and non-
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commercial motivations behind Chinese FDI has been the way that large Chinese state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) have been interested in either acquiring dominant majority share-holding 
of existing international corporations, or independently financing expensive green-field 
projects.
8
 The widely publicized dispute between the Aluminium Corporation of China 
(Chinalco) and Rio Tinto around 2009 seemed to confirm a perception that Chinese 
companies preferred to seek whole acquisitions in Australia. This is different to the model 
pursued by earlier generations of Asian investors in Australia – particularly the Japanese – 
who tended, at least initially, to pursue minority share positions. 
There is anecdotal evidence that the preference for majority shareholding on Australian 
projects by Chinese investors is reducing. There have been numerous cases of Chinese 
investors purchasing smaller shares in Australian companies or projects.
9 
 This is consistent 
with the views of a number of consultants and government officials who noted in interviews 
that there has been a trend towards Chinese investing in smaller shares on Australian projects.
 
Due to the lack of available statistics on the shareholding positions of all Chinese investments 
in Australia, it is not possible to know what percentage of Chinese investments are operating 
under a majority (or minority) Chinese share. 
This change has, however, had little impact on support for Chinese investment by Australians. 
According to the Lowy Institute Poll 2013, 57 per cent of Australians responded that the 
‘Australian Government is allowing too much investment from China’. This figure has 
remained consistent since 2010.
10
 
Chinese investors in Australia seem to understand the sensitivities surrounding their 
investments. According to a well-informed Australian mining executive, ‘a Chinese SOE 
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executive is fully aware that his company’s performance will be viewed as reflective of his 
country and even government.’11 
In China, it is the company executives, not their government regulators, who initiate FDI 
projects. This applies to state owned enterprises (SOEs) as well as enterprises that have other 
forms of ownership. An SOE executive has certain performance indicators such as earning a 
profit, improving the technical and managerial skills of his team, and establishing a positive 
reputation for his/her company.  These are the objectives that motivate SOE executives as 
they will dictate executives’ promotion prospects inside the company, in other SOEs and even 
in the government.  The movement of SOE executives between SOE and government roles 
leads some foreign observers to suspect executives of being Party agents. There is indeed a 
Chinese ‘revolving door’ in place. But, for an SOE executive to be successful on the job 
abroad, he/she must play by local rules. 
 
On my interview trips, it appeared that ‘SASAC’ had become a household reference to 
Australian discussions about Chinese SOEs. Indeed, in China, SASAC (the State-owned 
Asset Supervision and Administration Commission) is a key regulatory body for SOEs.  
There is a SASAC at the central government level, while local (province, city and below) 
levels of government also have a local level SASAC for their respective jurisdictions. As of 
June 2013, there are only 114 SOEs under the administration of SASAC at the level of the 
central government.
12
 
 
It is necessary to emphasize that under the Chinese system, an SOE is more a regulatory 
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reference than anything else. There are SOEs that are 100% government owned but 
increasingly SOEs have a more diversified ownership structure. As part of China’s economic 
reforms, significant changes in the structure and management of work organizations have 
taken place. In the mid-1990s, the Chinese government began to implement its ‘modern 
enterprise system’ and ‘group company system’ program. Basically, in China’s legal and 
administrative systems, an SOE is an independent entity.
13
 Under the group company system, 
an SOE is allowed to bring under its umbrella companies of virtually any form of ownership. 
When a Chinese company, SOEs included, initiates an investment abroad, it is subject to 
Chinese government approval. The main actors in the approval process at the central 
government level are SASAC, the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), the People’s Bank of 
China, the National Development and Reform Commission, and in some extraordinary cases, 
the State Council (China’s cabinet). Those SOEs that are under SASAC administration below 
the national level are also subject to approval, based on locally set rules and regulations. 
According to a 2009 MOFCOM document all companies ‘making [an] overseas investment 
with the amount of investment of ... US$100 million or more’ needs to apply for approval. 
Local enterprises (non-central enterprises) are additionally required to report all foreign 
investments between US$10 million and US$100 million to the provincial commerce 
department. 
14
At the national level and below, the basic policy formula is for companies to 
‘report and register’ their investment activities overseas. 
 
China’s ‘reverse Midas touch’ 
One reason less experienced Chinese investors have tended towards majority shares is due to 
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the country’s ‘reverse Midas touch’: because of the scale of its manufacturing exports, 
whenever Chinese enterprises enter a market they make whatever they offer cheap and 
whatever they demand expensive.
15 
The resulting situation is that the more finished products 
China exports, the cheaper per unit price it receives, but at the same time it needs to import 
more raw materials to manufacture these products, driving the price of raw materials up. So, 
Chinese companies have a built-in business incentive to be an investor and operator of raw 
materials, and not only a buyer of the end products. 
Persistent rises in prices for oil, minerals, food, and other bulk commodities, which have in 
part been a result of this ‘reverse Midas touch’ during the past decade, has led to the idea 
among Chinese commentators of the need for hua yu quan or ‘power to influence change’ 
over an industry or product globally.  As such, a continuation of efforts to acquire natural 
resources and/or the companies and facilities that produce them are justified on the ground 
that China must gain its hua yu quan in the global natural resource trade.
16
 
According to interviews with Sydney-based Chinese business consultants that advise Chinese 
businessmen on Australian mining investments, the notion of hua yu quan is fairly prevalent 
among first-time Chinese investors, their government regulators, and domestic financiers. 
Chinese business thinking tends to imagine that the more output from their investment, the 
greater leverage they will have over the per unit price of affected minerals to be imported into 
China. Hence, there is an interest to acquire the greatest share possible in an established 
company or mine. In contrast, established mining interests in Australia tend to strongly resist 
Chinese attempts to maximise share-holding. 
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What is Australia’s attraction to China as an investment destination? 
To a significant degree China’s interest in Australia as an investment destination simply 
reflects the law of supply and demand. In 1987 China’s Sinosteel formed a joint venture with 
Rio Tinto to develop the Channar iron ore mine in Western Australia.
17
 This project was 
China’s first significant offshore investment and its first in a developed economy. When the 
project was first proposed four years earlier, Australian mining companies like Rio Tinto were 
looking for a stable source of demand for their products in China and saw Chinese investment 
in Australian mines as a way to reinforce this. 
While there is some data available about the distribution of Chinese investment by state and 
industry, it is not easy to gauge the overall picture of Chinese investment in Australia in terms 
of average percentage shareholding, profit outcomes and perceptions by Chinese investors. As 
such, the following observations are based on my understanding of China's foreign economic 
policy and the China-Australia relationship in general, coupled with insights gained through 
interviews conducted in Australia. 
Beyond basic supply and demand issues there are five key reasons why Australia is seen as an 
attractive destination for Chinese investment: 
(1) Goodwill between Australia and China 
(2) Trust in Australia as a low political-risk destination to operate a business 
(3) A desire to prove a company’s capacity to operate in a developed economy 
(4) Stable supply of high quality resources 
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(5) Company profit 
First, in April 2005, Australia earned much goodwill in China when it became only the 
second developed country to recognise China’s market economy status (after New Zealand, 
which did so a year earlier). For China, being treated as a market economy removed one of 
the de-facto ‘China exception’ clauses it had to accept in its 15-year long negotiations to join 
the WTO.
18
 As of 2013, China is still campaigning to be recognized as a market economy by 
the United States and most of the member states of the European Union.
 
 Wishful as it may 
seem in retrospect, Australia’s move was expected to set a precedent for more OECD 
countries to follow. 
Second, Australia is attractive when it comes to Chinese considerations of non-commercial 
risk. There are few if any historical issues or sources of tension to overcome. While 
Australians did fight Chinese troops alongside South Koreans and Americans in the Korean 
War, the two countries do not have territorial disputes.  Moreover, in contrast to China’s 
economic ties with many other countries (especially those in the developing world), Australia 
has a stable political system, a strong record in applying the rule of law to settle commercial 
disputes, and a safe social environment. Since the early 2000s, the risks associated with 
Chinese investments in resource extraction in a number of developing countries have become 
more widely known in Chinese society, thanks in part to the globalization of China’s media 
services. The kidnapping and loss of life of Chinese employees has increased pressure on the 
Chinese government to rapidly and effectively ensure the safety of Chinese industrial workers 
overseas.
19
 But the Chinese government is caught between its position on non-intervention in 
other countries’ affairs and domestic demands for the guarantee of safety for its workers 
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overseas. Investment in Australia offers China – its companies and government agencies – a 
way to avoid a host of risks it has to deal with in many other countries. 
Third, Australia, like other developed economies, offers a useful testing ground for Chinese 
companies to establish a solid international reputation. Historically, a typical pattern of 
Chinese FDI projects, especially those in developing countries, was for the Chinese 
government to cooperate by offering economic aid as an enticement and frequently a 
necessary precondition. While such aid was useful and in many cases instrumental for a 
Chinese company to prevail in the bidding process, it was often an obstacle to improving the 
international competitiveness of Chinese companies. The use of aid to win bids does not 
provide any incentive for Chinese companies to upgrade their technological and managerial 
know-how. This is not conducive to their long-term growth. Furthermore, investment through 
aid often leads to more aid provisions since the recipient government frequently falls into a 
cycle of aid dependence. When Chinese workers are caught in social strife in an aid recipient 
country, the Chinese government comes under heavy domestic criticism for seemingly having 
wasted the country’s resources and goodwill.20 
By contrast, in a developed economy such as Australia, Chinese companies have to engage in 
genuine international competition to win investment bids. This often means that companies 
are forced to go through a process of engineering or managerial learning that improves their 
capabilities over the longer term. If a company can become successful in Australia, it adds to 
its ability to compete in other developed country economies as well. 
Fourth, profit is also a driving factor. It is one of the key performance indicators for Chinese 
SOE executives. And it is executives, after all, who make the decision to invest abroad. The 
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rapid rise in resource prices worldwide, fuelled in large part by China’s economic growth, is 
what attracted Chinese investors to the Australian resource sector. 
In my interviews, public rhetoric unfavourable to Chinese investment in the Australian 
resources sector was a less serious a concern than being able to maintain profit against the 
background of volatility in resource prices and the global economy. This is particularly true 
after the decision to invest has been made. 
Entering the 2000s, as Chinese demand for iron ore and other minerals started to increase, and 
as traditional sources of demand for iron ore in Europe, North American and Japan started to 
decline or stabilize, there emerged an opportunity for Chinese companies to venture into 
green field and expansion projects overseas. As noted earlier, China’s ‘reverse Midas touch’ 
means that Chinese resource extraction companies see an opportunity for themselves – high 
resources prices coupled with stable demand in China . In terms of destination, Chinese 
resource investment footprints cover not just Australia, but also Brazil, India, and South 
Africa, all major suppliers of resources. 
Fifth, securing a reliable supply of resources is attractive to Chinese companies. This is a goal 
of both of Chinese SOEs and the Chinese government. A reliable supply of resources not only 
allows an SOE to meet demand from customers in China, it also allows companies to 
establish downstream networks in China because there is confidence that supply will not be 
interrupted. This also serves the national (government) interest of having materials and energy 
to develop the country. 
China is a vast country and fairly rich in minerals. But, to use iron ore as an example, 
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investing in its extraction in Australia is logical in an industry sense. Domestically in China, 
the iron ore industry faces a number of structural challenges. China’s iron ore is low-grade, 
expensive to process, and its mines are being depleted. For many Chinese steelmakers, 
particularly in the coastal regions, the delivered cost of domestic iron ore is more than that of 
foreign ore. China has become a leading importer of iron ore worldwide.
21
 
This has been reflected by a number of experienced Chinese investors in Australia pursuing 
off-take agreements, which allows the investor to take a large share of the production output 
while also maintaining a non-majority share in the company. For example, Sinopec holds a 25 
per cent stake in the Australia Pacific LNG project in Queensland. The investment includes a 
majority off-take agreement for Sinopec.
22
 At the smaller end the scale, the Anshan Iron and 
Steel Group Corporation (Ansteel) and Gindalbie Metals Limited 50-50 joint venture 
agreement allows AnSteel to take 100 per cent of the production from the JV’s Karara mine.23 
By guaranteeing a destination market for the production output from these projects, Chinese 
investors help ensure project viability. 
Chinese investment in Australia: reading through perceptions of risk 
This section will explore the perceptions of risk in three main areas. First, operational issues 
will be considered. Then, the various perceptions of the foreign investment review process 
will be explored. Finally, I will comment on geopolitical considerations for Chinese investors. 
It should be noted here that causes for the outcome of a committed investment are essentially 
impossible for a non-participant to ascertain, much less to assess. With this caveat in mind, 
the following presentation touches on issues that, in my mind, merit consideration in further 
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discussions about Chinese investment in Australia, in a broadly general sense. 
First, what ‘gaps in expectation’ arise for Chinese companies in Australia at the operational 
level? 
Operating a cross-border investment project, after all, involves mastering the rules and norms 
on site of an approved project. The federal system of governance in Australia means that local 
rules and norms are as important as federal ones to master, and in many cases more so. From 
interviews, I see three ‘gaps in expectation’ that exist at the operational level for Chinese 
companies investing in Australia. 
The first ‘gap in expectation’ – in the sense of expectations of newcomer investors from China 
– is the occasional de facto requirement for minority share-holding in pursuing a merger and 
acquisition (M&A) project. This is not a written rule, but rather a norm that has been 
intermittently enforced through the Foreign Investment Review Board (FIRB) at the federal 
level. It now appears to be widely understood that any purchase of over 50 per cent of either 
BHP or Rio Tinto would not pass FIRB. But there are other examples. When China 
Nonferrous Metal Mining Co (CNMC) attempted to purchase 51.66 per cent of Lynas Rare 
Earths, FIRB required CNMC to reduce its proposed ownership of Lynas to less than 50 per 
cent and to ensure its directors did not take more than half the board positions in the company. 
This condition was considered too onerous by CNMC, which then withdrew from the deal. 
At the state level, there also seems to be a ‘rule of thumb’ for certain projects. For example 
following the extended delay of the Oakajee Port and Rail project in Western Australia, 
Chinese investors have shown a willingness to invest in the project, but as Padbury Mining 
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chief executive Gary Stokes notes, ‘the ownership has to be Australian’ adding: ‘It's the 
elephant in the room – the Chinese understand that.’24 There also seems to be a preference for 
large resource companies to take Chinese investors on as a source of capital and a stable 
demand as opposed to a majority shareholder. 
A recurrent point of reflection in my interviews with Chinese banking executives, who have 
operated in Melbourne and Sydney for over a decade, is that new Chinese investors generally 
do not fully understand the factors which may lead them to having to take a minority share in 
an investment. In China, foreign companies are allowed to hold a controlling share (51%) and 
even have 100% ownership of a project.  Furthermore, when approving inbound FDI projects 
China does not demand declaration or clarification of state ownership. There is an expectation 
of reciprocal treatment. Following the FIRB rejection of the China Nonferrous Metal Mining 
purchase of Lynas Rare Earths, Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yu said, ‘For a long 
time, China has had an open policy when it comes to foreign companies investing here.’25 
From an Australian perspective, this expectation is challenging because foreign investment in 
certain sectors in China is indeed restricted. However, from a Chinese viewpoint, the 
restricted sectors in China are clearly defined and not based on ownership structure. In 
Australia, there is no clear written definition on what enterprises, particularly SOEs, can or 
cannot invest in. Instead, there is an intentionally vague ‘national interest test’ with no 
legislated rules for what constitutes the ‘national interest’. 
The second ‘gap in expectation’ that came up in my interviews in Perth, focusing on the 
operational aspects of mining projects, is the need for the investor to provide major 
infrastructure such as roads, ports, electricity, and water for green field resource projects. In 
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Western Australia, that infrastructure is the responsibility of the mine operator. But in China, 
it is the local government that builds those facilities as a pre-condition for establishing a green 
field investment project. This applies to both foreign investors and Chinese investors from 
outside a particular administrative jurisdiction. 
My interviews in Perth revealed that some experienced Chinese mining operators see the 
Western Australian government’s approach as understandable. The interviewees noted that it 
is an established tradition for any mining operator to be responsible for enabling the whole 
process from mining to loading onto ships for trade. They also stated that basic infrastructure, 
given the extremely low population density, can have little public utility. Hence, from my 
perspective there is solid logic behind Australian norms. It is just that the standard practices 
between China and Australia are different. 
Both of the two aforementioned ‘gaps in expectations’, as one Sydney-based Australian 
expert with a deep knowledge of both the Australian and Chinese environments emphasised, 
can be narrowed through ‘learning-by-doing’. In fact, Chinese investors perhaps err by 
speaking to the media, either in Australia or in China, about their ‘difficulty’ in grappling 
with Australian norms. Those articulations tend to trigger negative media commentary, 
leading to concerns that Chinese investors are in Australia to demand change to long-
established norms. 
Finally, the third ‘gap in expectation’, is the ‘rule of the thumb’ practice for the engineering, 
construction, procurement, and management (ECPM) to be done by local operators. I do 
believe that, at least in the mining sector, this can be a source of real incompatibility. After all, 
one notable reason for a Chinese company executive to justify investing in Australia is to 
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internationalize the company's managerial staff. On the one hand, productivity and efficiency 
in engineering requires synergy among the personnel and an engineer sent by a Chinese 
company may or may not fit in quickly enough. Preference for construction and procurement 
to be local can also be viewed through this lens. 
On the other hand, if Chinese managers are not exposed to the operational process, one can 
question what added value the investment generates. After all, an investment limited to share-
holding only – with uncertain returns – does not always assist a Chinese company executive, 
whose has to answer to questions from his home government evaluators about the added value 
earned. As mentioned in the previous section, one of the attractions of Chinese investment to 
Australia is that it provides a good chance to test and improve a company’s capabilities and 
develop an investment brand. 
Taken together, the three noticeable areas of incompatibility between Chinese and Australian 
practices are market-based in nature. But they could become a bigger issue as more and more 
Chinese companies enter the Australian investment environment unprepared. 
 
Second, how do Australia’s Foreign Investment Review Board (FIRB)’s requirements for 
approval of state-owned enterprise (SOE) investments affect Chinese assessments of risk? 
FIRB as a topic frequently surfaced in my interviews. There were a wide range of views 
expressed, some of which were contradictory. These can be summarised as the following.  
First, Chinese investors with significant experience in investing in Australia mostly indicated 
that FIRB was not a serious issue and that over time they have come to understand the way 
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FIRB works. Second, Australian government representatives and some Australian business 
people said that establishment of FIRB dates back to 1976 (when Chinese companies did not 
even contemplate investing in Australia), operates transparently, and updates its criteria for 
review periodically. Third, Australian government and business people also said that the high 
rate of approved proposals demonstrates that media speculation about Chinese investments 
being discriminated against is unwarranted. Fourth, some academics working in Australia said 
that published approval rates can be deceptive because investors are sometimes advised in 
advance by FIRB that their applications would be unsuccessful, or that restrictions will be 
placed on the investment. Thus, some companies choose to withdraw their application; hence 
those cases are excluded in the official compilation. Fifth, numerous interviewees of different 
backgrounds said that Chinese investors are fast learners in navigating the process. 
China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) does include the substance and procedure of 
FIRB in its country introduction of Australia as a foreign investment destination. This 
document is updated annually and lists the official websites of Australian government 
agencies that play a role in handling incoming FDI.
26
 
Comments attributed by the Australian Financial Review to Jerry Jiao, president of China 
Minmetals Non-Ferrous, an SOE, whose partnership with the Melbourne-based MMG 
Limited is generally seen as a successful, provides a sense of Chinese executives’ awareness 
of Western sensitivities about state ownership. ‘We always say we can't choose our parent but 
what we can choose is to behave as a nice baby.’27 During interviews with Australian and 
Chinese executives, it was generally acknowledged that once approved, the ownership 
structure of a Chinese investment is seldom an issue of concern. 
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The issue of state ownership may, instead, be read as a ‘China clause’. As I see it, 
examination of the ownership structure of an incoming Chinese investment should not be a 
substitute for an examination of a company’s previous performance.  This is particularly true 
in the mining and agriculture sectors, which require proper understanding and handling of the 
engineering and technological aspects of a project. In China’s case, the most experienced 
companies tend to be SOEs. 
Third, in what ways may Asia-Pacific geopolitical dynamics factor in Chinese assessments of 
Australia in terms of sovereign risk? 
The topic of regional geopolitics was raised by a number of interviewees. An underlying 
theme in the discussion is Australia’s visible role in the United States’ ‘pivot’ or ‘re-
balancing’ to Asia, which is widely accepted in Chinese quarters as mainly and almost 
exclusively aimed at China’s pursuit of prosperity and deeper engagement with its 
neighbours. Chinese investors’ disquiet centres on hypothetical Australian actions to protect 
their assets, should Canberra make a clear-cut geopolitical choice between Beijing and 
Washington. Australian business professionals, in turn, are concerned that China’s investment 
into Australia could be curtailed by geopolitical factors. 
From Beijing's perspective, because of Australia’s close security relationship with the United 
States, it is difficult to ascertain the degree to which security ties between Australia and China 
derive from those between China and the United States. Australia’s relationship with the 
United States and its role in the ‘pivot’ does not currently affect the Chinese-Australian 
investment relationship. But if a downturn occurred in the broader Australia-China or US-
China bilateral relationships, there is a potential that it could impact on the Australia-China 
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economic relationship. FDI is always more sensitive and difficult than trade, so it is often 
more vulnerable to fluctuations in the wider security-diplomatic relationship. 
It would be useful for Canberra and Beijing to bring their respective underlying senses of 
uncertainty about each other to the forefront of discussion and debate. Such an exercise can, 
for example, put into perspective Chinese apprehension about a return to the two decades of 
total trade embargo by the United States and its security allies that it experienced from the 
1950s through the 1970s. The web of linkages which the Chinese economy has weaved with 
the rest of the world provides a level of assurance against repetition of the past. Still, this 
would make it more natural for Chinese regulators of investment outflows to have a clearer 
sense of seeing their foreign investment assets protected by the host government under 
scenarios of deep tension and in the worst case active hostility.  It should also help address 
Australian worries about over dependence on China in both trade and investment. 
Thus far, as I found on the basis of interviews with Chinese executives in Australia, that there 
is also a bureaucratic concern for Chinese SOEs operating in Australia.  Chinese government 
regulators conduct reviews of profit-generation of investments according to a fixed timeline. 
This is a source of pressure on those executives who initiated and/or are managing investment 
projects abroad. An unintended consequence of this pressure to produce profit rapidly is that 
many Chinese SOE investment projects start off with defects that will prove costly to amend. 
These defects can range from insufficient due diligence in project and partner selection to 
competition against fellow Chinese investors. The desire to appear to get a project ‘done fast’ 
can result in face-saving posturing by citing lack of goodwill on the part of Australian parties 
as a cause of project failure that is ‘beyond their control’. 
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Conclusion 
Key outcomes of my research can be summarised as follows. First, there is less strategy in 
China’s ‘go out’ policy than public rhetoric suggests. Chinese company executives, not their 
government regulators, initiate investment projects and the executives are evaluated on their 
performance in profit generation from established FDI projects. China has its own systems for 
approving both inbound and outbound FDI. 
Second, Australia is an attractive destination for Chinese FDI. While profit remains a key 
driver, there are other factors that make Australia attractive.  Some Chinese companies wish 
to turn from a buyer of industrial materials to an investor and operator of their production. 
Absence of residual security issues between the two countries is also an important factor, as it 
contributes to low concerns over sovereign risk. In addition, success in the Australian market 
can help a Chinese company enhance its credentials in becoming a truly global multinational 
corporation. 
Third, questioning in quarters of the Australian society about ulterior motivations behind 
Chinese FDI reflects the short history of large scale inflow of Chinese investment capital. 
China’s footprint in the Australian mining sector follows a historical pattern of investment 
activities from other countries in Northeast Asia. A key point of contention between Chinese 
attempts and Australian reactions is about the level of share-holding, at least in the project 
establishment phase. 
The following issues, though certainly not exhaustive, merit further consideration, in the 
interest of building up a more stable relationship in investment and trade between China and 
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Australia in the future. 
One, there is a need for comprehensive examination and wide publicity – conducted by 
authoritative agencies -- of the record of performance of established Chinese investments. 
Mining attracts much space in public discussion. However, when ‘exports from China’s 
biggest single mining investment in Australia [the CITIC Pacific Sino Iron project] had still 
not begun’ (reportedly three years behind target date), sustainability of Chinese investor 
confidence may have been adversely affected.
28
 After all, profit is the single most powerful 
driver when measuring investment success. 
A necessary component of such an examination must include case studies of success and 
failure, together with an assessment of the practical lessons that Chinese investors and their 
Australian partners need to learn about doing business with each other. Doing so can help 
promote ‘best practice’ models for Chinese investors to benefit from, which in turn is 
conducive in the pursuit of a long term relationship among Australian and Chinese businesses. 
Two, more effort needs to be made to familiarise aspiring Chinese investors with the laws and 
rules of Australia as an investment destination. This needs to be done before the border, i.e., 
before an investment application is conceived. Details matter, so does their publicity. 
Increasingly, Chinese companies with little or no prior experience in or exposure to business 
practices in a foreign (much less advanced) economy are trying their luck by ‘going out’. Due 
to the evolving economic system in China there is no set model to pursue FDI.
29
 
Doing so can be beneficial to Australian interests as it can help prevent misperceptions and 
even possible misrepresentations of FIRB at the national level, and regulations and rules at 
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the state and local levels. More publicity of norms is also helpful. A particular case in point is 
that a Chinese investor may want to be directly involved in all phases of a project. In contrast, 
Australian interviewees indicated that the Chinese side needs to approach the Australian 
investment environment by accepting more local involvement in the ECPM to avoid cost 
overruns and project delays. Meanwhile, the author believes that the Australian side should 
make an effort to include as much Chinese involvement in the same process on the basis of 
compatible capacities, both technical and managerial. A strong commitment on both sides to 
pursuing ‘good faith’ interactions is needed to avoid misunderstanding of intent. 
Third, geopolitical concerns lurking in the background need to be addressed early on and in a 
frank manner. China does not see Australia as a threat. Public discourse in Australia contains 
references to China as a possible threat. Continued stories of investment failure together with 
the question of sovereign treatment of assets should geopolitical dynamics in the region turn 
toward active hostility is not conducive to public support in China for prioritising Australia. 
It is in the long-term interest of both Australia and China to treat the policy durability of two-
way investment flows as seriously as they handle specific cases. Doing so would be a positive 
contribution to improving the overall bilateral relationship as well. 
All in all, cross-border investment is, for all stakeholders, about choice. Investment flows go 
through a globally competitive process and there is a mutual need for a productive and 
predictable relationship, both for source and destination countries. Non-commercial risk, 
either from the Chinese or Australian side, is not yet a major issue. Yet, there is little 
justification for complacency. 
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